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The Brezhnev Doctrine states the official Soviet theory of the law
governing the use of force by States. Most explicitly formulated in con-
nection with the 1968 crisis over Czechoslovakia and addressed to rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and other communist States, the
Doctrine has general significance because it interprets the law purport-
ing to govern the international use of force. As the United Nations
Charter makes clear, that branch of international law defines the most
important structural features of the international system.
The Soviet position in world politics heightens the importance of the
Brezhnev Doctrine. Though a co-author of the U.N. Charter and Per-
manent Member of the Security Council,' the Soviet Union interprets
traditional norms embedded in the language of the Charter so as to
change the definition of security and the rights of States to protect
themselves. Soviet theory affects the safety of all members of the inter-
national system, and world acceptance of the Brezhnev Doctrine as law
in part will depend on the international balance of power. If non-com-
munist States, or States rejecting the Soviet theory, treat the Brezhnev
Doctrine as a challenge to the order they support and seek successfully
to rebut it, then they must reply on the level of theory as well as of
power.
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter2 affirm that the international sys-
tem consists of sovereign States and that these States exist by right.
They may use force in their international relations only pursuant to a
decision of the U.N. Security Council or in the exercise of what the
Charter calls the "inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School.
1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
Art. 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. .. ."
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fence.' 3 In its version of Charter law, the Soviet government asserts a
different perspective, qualifying the universality of the Charter. Soviet
forces may intervene to preserve the "gains of socialism" 4 when a com-
munist government finds itself in danger of collapse by reason of do-
mestic unpopularity.5 Though Soviet jurists are skilled in quoting
orthodox, western versions of international law against what they re-
gard as the illegal use of force by bourgeois States, they invoke the
Brezhnev Doctrine as an exception to justify Soviet actions. The Char-
ter declares that all States are equal in sovereignty.6 The Brezhnev
Doctrine suggests that some States are more equal than others.
The Soviet view focuses on social and economic systems as the
source of international behavior. States are fictions used by dominant
social classes to legitimate their domination. Though in Marxist-Len-
inist theory the State will disappear when Communism is established,
Soviet doctrine acknowledges the right of communist parties to use
such a fiction in helping to achieve the goals of the international social-
ist movement, the task of communist parties. Nothing in Soviet doc-
trine requires that one see States as inviolable. At the same time,
whenever Soviet sovereignty or security is in question, doctrine yields
to the requirements of the Soviet Union qua State. In Soviet eyes, in-
ternational tension inevitably exists between States with different social
structures and, therefore, the predominating interests of the U.S.S.R. as
a State may be invoked at any time.
Soviet arguments are products of Marxist-Leninist ideology and So-
viet history, a fact that shapes this Article. Parts I and II analyze the
influence of past events and ideological positions on current Soviet the-
ory. The Hungarian crisis of 1956 stands out as signally important in
the evolution of the Brezhnev Doctrine and, in this perspective, re-
ceives detailed treatment. Part III takes up the 1968 Czech crisis and
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the light of the analysis in the
first two sections and evaluates the legal case for Soviet action. The
Article urges States that disagree with the Soviet perspective on inter-
national law to answer the Brezhnev Doctrine with a legal theory based
on Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter and the nature of the States sys-
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
4. Letter from Soviet Politburo to Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czech-
oslovakia (July 15, 1968) ("The Warsaw Letter"), reprintedin Soviet News, July 23, 1968, at
39; The Defence of Socialism is Our Supreme Internationalist Duty, Pravda, Aug. 22, 1968
(editorial), reprintedin Soviet News, Aug. 27, 1968, at 87.
5. See text accompanying notes 129-49 infra.
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1: "The Organization is based on the principle of the




tern. To make that answer more than empty wind, States, and particu-
larly the United States, must complement their legal theory with
foreign and defense policies that reflect their perspective as well as pro-
tect their interests.
I. Theory and Practice, 1917-1956 -
Soviet writers and officials derive their interpretation of international
law from the Marxist criticism of law in general. It is an axiom of
Soviet legal scholarship that law is a superstructure of norms reflecting
the class organization of society and serving the interests of the domi-
nant class.7 In the view of G.I. Tunkin, one of the best known and
most prolific Soviet scholars, particular economic structures at particu-
lar historical times determine the characteristics of all law, including
international law. International law also responds to the pressure of
other superstructural elements, for example, politics and morals. As he
summarized his analysis:
Law in the judicial sense is a system of obligating norms, which express
the will of the ruling class of a State, or as in the case of international
law,-the coordinated wills of States, i.e. of the ruling classes of those
States; these norms are always connected with enforcement measures un-
dertaken by a State or, as in international law, also by several States
jointly.'
Soviet participation in the States system and status as a Permanent
Member of the United Nations make the Soviet Union a significant
contributor to the enforceable superstructure that is international law.
At the same time, Soviet lawyers insist that the U.S.S.R. remains a dis-
tinctive kind of State. They articulate a theory of generally applicable
international law that accommodates the reality of the existing States
system to what they view as the distinctive character and role of social-
ist countries.
The Soviet Union has claimed to have had a particular impact on
international law and politics since the 1917 Revolution. The Allies of
the First World War, for example, declared that they represented lib-
erty, justice, and democracy; their Versailles Treaty and Covenant of
the League of Nations codified rules of international politics consistent,
the Allies thought, with their self-image and the traditional view of the
7. See G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-34 (1974); Krylov, Les notions
principales du drolt desgens (la doctrinesoviktique du drolt international), 70 HAGuE RECUEIL
407, 418-20 (1947); Beime & Sharlet, Introduction to E. PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WmTINGS
ON MARXISM AND LAw 1-36 (1980); . LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS SOVIETIQUES DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL PuBLIC 63-122 (1954); I. LAPENNA, STATE AND LAW 7-19, 80-95 (1964).
8. Tunkin, Co-Existence and International Law, 95 HAGUE RECUEIL 1, 49 (1958).
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 7:209, 1981
overriding international role and value of States.9 Lenin and his fol-
lowers lumped the belligerents together as imperialists merely con-
testing the right to oppress and exploit the world. 10 Soviet doctrine
during the twenties affirmed as truth Lenin's conclusion that developed
Capitalism was inherently imperialistic and militaristic" and therefore
imcompatible with a communist State representing the other side of the
class struggle.12 While later jurists found evidence of Lenin's interest
in peaceful coexistence with capitalist States,' 3 E. Pashukanis, a leading
academician of the twenties, probably more accurately represented
early views in arguing that Western ideas about international law
amounted to the legal form of the class struggle: 14 "[w]ith the emer-
gence of Soviet states in the historical arena, international law. . . be-
comes the form of a temporary compromise between two antagonistic
class systems."' s
Pashukanis' emphasis on the temporary nature of the socialist-capi-
talist compromise reflected the behavior of the Soviet State. In the
twenties, the Soviet Union emerged from diplomatic isolation by
9. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10: "The Members of the League
undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League."
10. See A. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE 36 (2d ed. 1974). See also Decree on
Peace, Nov. 8, 1917, 1 SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY 1-3 (J. Degras ed. 1951)
(appeal to governments and peoples engaged in World War I to negotiate peace based on
principle of no annexations and no indemnities) [hereinafter cited as SOVIET DOCUMENTS].
11. See generally A. ULAM, sufora note 10, at 27; V. LENIN, IMPERIALISM (1916).
12. For example, Lenin said on March 18, 1919:
We live not only in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet
Republic side by side with imperialist states for a prolonged period is inconceivable.
Ultimately either one or the other shall be victorious. And when this end comes, a
number of terrible conflicts between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states are
inevitable.
In G. TUNKiN, supra note 7, at 16 (emphasis in original).
To avoid unnecessary confusion, in this Article I use the term communist where a Soviet
writer might use either socialist or communist depending on whether, for example, he meant
social structures or political parties respectively.
13. Perhaps one should be skeptical of their research. See, e.g., R. HIGGINS, CONFLICT
OF INTERESTS 115 (1965) (Soviet efforts to show Lenin originated idea of peaceful coexis-
tence interpreted his favoring "certain minimal treaty relationships" with bourgeois States as
consistent with view of Soviet government and jurists in 1950's).
14. See E. PASHUKANIS, Selectionsfrom the Encyclopedia of State andLaw, in SELECTED
WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 166, 169, 172-73 (1980). Pashukanis was executed during
the purges of the 1930's for reasons unassociated with his view of international law. See
generally Hazard, Pashukanis is No Traitor, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 385-88 (1957).
In this Article, unless used geographically, western means the League or U.N. conception
of world order based on the States system.
15. See E. PASHUKANIS, supra note 14, at 172; f. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (1965) (international law "means those rules of




closely collaborating with Germany in military, economic, and political
affairs. 16 Without relinquishing its analysis of international law and
relations, the Soviet State secured de jure recognition by Britain,
France, and later the United States. 17 At the same time, the Soviet
government retained as policy radical aspects of its theory. Though
first applied to areas that formed part of the Russian Empire, the Soviet
policy towards national self-determination provided an early and still
valid example of the practical implication of Soviet thinking.
The Russian Empire was multi-national and threatened to explode
into separate nation-States. From the beginning, this fact created a
problem for the Soviet government. Though the new Russian govern-
ment had ceded vast territories to Germany in 1918,1s it had no inten-
tion of prematurely dissolving the State. Before the Revolution, Lenin
and the Bolsheviks argued that historically, and, inevitably, peoples
achieved national status in three stages: raising their consciousness of
nationhood; winning formal equality in bourgeois democracy; and,
finally, self-determination. 19 Before 1917, Lenin had recognized the
right to self-determination for all peoples-even to the point of the
political separation of certain national groups from Russia.20 Once in
authority and confronted by separatist movements in, for example, the
Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkestan,2' the Bolsheviks sought to prevent
the break-up of Russia without giving up their doctrine.
Stalin resolved the contradiction. As Commissar for Nationalities,
Stalin emphasized as decisive Lenin's distinction between having the
right to self-determination and secession and exercising that right.
Both Lenin and Stalin believed that because the communist party by
definition is the party of the proletariat, it must occupy the leadership
16. See generally, H. GATZKE, STRESEMANN AND THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY
(1954); A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 146-67.
17. See M. BELOFF, I THE FOREIoN POLICY OF SOVIET RussiA 5-6, 122-23 (1947); A.
ULAM, supra note 10, at 147, 213-14; T. TARAcouzio, WAR AND PEACE IN SOVIET DIPLO-
MAcy 113-17, 318 (1940); L TRisKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF
SOVIET TREATIES 183-91, 453-54 (1962).
18. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Mar. 3, 1918, 223 Parry's T.S. 81. By this Treaty, Russia lost
one-third of its population. A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 71.
19. See G. TuNKIN, DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 42-51 (1965); G. TUNKIN, supra
note 7, at 7-14; L. BUCHHUET, SECESSION 121-37 (1978); B. RAMTNDO, THE (SOVIET) SO-
CIALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1964).
20. See Pap, Lenin and the Problem of Self-Determination of Nations, in LENIN AND
LENINISM 144-45 (B. Eissenstat ed. 1971); J. LALOY, POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE DE I'URSS 26-
28 (stenographic notes of course offered at the Institut d'ttudes Politiques, Paris, France,
1970-71) (copy on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
21. The Bolsheviks confronted similar movements in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Byelorussia, Armenia, and Cossakia. See Pap, supra note 20, at 145; Resolution on the
National Question (May 12, 1917), in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION 355-56
(A. Rubinstein ed. 2d ed. 1966).
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positions in movements for national liberation.22 In practice, their po-
sition meant that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would
judge whether groups within the Union claiming to represent the peo-
ple in fact did so. Under Stalin's conception, only communist parties
received recognition as capable of exercising the right of self-determi-
nation; self-determination and membership in the Union were
synonymous.
Stalin's successors have used his approach as a model. According to
Soviet policy and theory, even an approved communist party may not
exercise the right to self-determination and secede from the U.S.S.R.,
or, if the communist party of an independent State, implement policies
viewed in Moscow as hostile to the U.S.S.R. If hostile policies are
adopted, then the party in question is presumed to have succumbed to
the deceptions and tricks of imperialists and bourgeois reactionaries.
In other words, it has ceased to be an authentic communist party.23
This argument formed an important element in the legal case for in-
vading Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslavakia in 1968.
A. Soviet application of international law: 1934-1945
Soviet theories about the law governing the international use of force
and Soviet foreign policy have had to reconcile similar contradictions
between ideology and practice. The U.S.S.R. has viewed itself both as
a State with national interests to protect and national rights to assert
and as the vanguard of world socialist revolution.24 Implicitly, the So-
viet government and Soviet commentators have denied that the inter-
national system consists of independent States, existing by right qua
States without regard to their constitution. At the same time they insist
on the inviolability of Soviet sovereignty.
22. See Resolution on the National Question, supra note 21; Preliminary Draft Theses on
the National and Colonial Questions (June 5, 1920), in FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET
UNION, supra note 21, at 360-63; Stalin, The National Question (Apr., 1924), in id at 363-64;
Program of the Communist International (Sept. 1, 1928), in id at 370-73; E. PASHUKANIS,
Lenin and Problems ofLaw, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 133, 156-62
(1980); T. TARACOuzIO, supra note 17, at 28-39. See also LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV-
ICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE SOVIET EMPIRE: PRISON
House OF NATIONS AND RACES 6-13 (Comm. Print 1958) (contains full quotations from
Soviet documents on nationality question and nationality policy of U.S.S.R.).
23. See M. BELOFF, supra note 17, at 2-4 ("official Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the
Soviet rulers offered no prospect of permanent peace"); speech by N. Khrushchev, (Jan. 6,
1961), in DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1961 259, 267-68, 271 (D. Watt ed.
1965) (devotion of communist parties to peace; responsibility of communist parties to com-
munist movement). Soviet policy towards Hungary had given meaning to Khrushchev's
words that contradicted his assertion of the absence of Soviet Communist Party leadership
and domination of other communist parties. See text accompanying notes 87-101 infra.




The first formal pitting of these roles against each other in legal
terms came in 1934 when the Soviet Union joined the League of Na-
tions and became a permanent member of its Council.25 League mem-
bership and the threat to Soviet security posed by National Socialist
Germany and Imperial Japan shaped Soviet legal as well as political
behavior. With regard to colonial empires, Soviet policy and doctrine
consistently had supported the idea that anti-colonialist wars were law-
ful because they involved revolts by oppressed peoples.26 But, in the
mid-thirties, the condition of world politics led Stalin to seek good rela-
tions with Britain and France. Anti-colonial wars of liberation would
conflict with that goal. Stalin, therefore, told the British that their Em-
pire was a great force for peace;27 two months later, in May, 1935, he
signed a defensive alliance with France.28 After the Germans remilita-
rized the Rhineland,29 the Soviet Ambassador in London declared that
peace was "indivisible." 30
These acts and pronouncements emphasized the sanctity of States in
order to strengthen Soviet security against the German threat. Others
followed. Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov became one of
the most visible advocates of collective action and solidarity by the
League of Nations to deter aggression and promote stability.31 Mos-
cow allowed communist parties in France and Spain to join with other
parliamentary parties in governing coalitions.32 At the same time, the
atmosphere of the last years of peace invited foreign policies based on
the narrowest and most expedient visions of national interest. Viola-
tions of international law encouraged the breakdown of taboos against
aggression.33
Nothing that happened in the nineteen-thirties counteracted Stalin's
25. Id at 136; A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 221.
26. Ginsburgs, "Wars ofLiberation" and the Modem Law of Nations-he Soviet Thesis,
in THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 66, 74-77 (H. Baade ed. 1965) (colonialism
per se aggression; thus liberation struggle can not be aggressive and unlawful).
27. Telegram from Viscount Chilston to Sir J. Simon (Mar. 30, 1935), reprinted in 12
DOCUMENTS ON BRIrISH FOREIGN POLICY: 1919-1939, SECOND SERIES, No. 669 (1972) (re-
port of A. Eden on meeting with Stalin).
28. 1 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1935 116-19 (1936).
29. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) established and the Treaties of Locarno (1925) con-
firmed the creation of a demilitarized zone 50 kms. wide on both sides of the Rhine from
Switzerland to the Netherlands. The Germans remilitarized the zone on March 7, 1936. See
general, J. EMMERSON, THE RHINELAND CRISIS (1977).
30. Speech by Ivan Maisky (Mar. 19, 1936), in 3 SOVIET DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at
180 (quoting Litvinov).
31. See M. LITVNov, AGAINST AGGRESSION 96-101 (speech to League of Nations, Sept.
21, 1937), 109-13 (speech, Feb. 1, 1938), 117-31 (speech to League of Nations, Sept. 21, 1938)
(1939).
32. See R. SONTAG, A BROKEN WORLD 295-304 (1971).
33. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 107-08
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suspicion of the western capitalist democracies or lessened his fear that
they would passively accept and even perhaps encourage a German
attack against the Soviet Union.34 Given widespread international
mistrust and opportunism, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and
Protocol of August 23, 1939, which contemplated the partition of Po-
land,35 could be justified as postponing war with Germany;36 it also fit
a policy of independence from a rigidly coherent doctrine about inter-
national order.
Once the war began on September 2, 1939, Germany and the Soviet
Union annexed their shares of Poland under the agreement of August
23. Recognizing the importance of appearances, the Soviet government
has never acknowledged that these arrangments led to a fourth parti-
tion of Poland.37 To justify its actions and defend itself against critics
accusing the Soviet Union of imperialism, Moscow appealed to princi-
ples of traditional international law. The Soviet argument followed
this sequence: the German advance after September 2 was so rapid
and so successful that Poland appeared almost an empty shell. It was
defenseless, abandoned by its government.38 This fact created a risk of
German attack in eastern Europe. The Soviet invasion of Poland on
September 17, 1939, therefore, amounted to self-defense. It also served
as an instrument for the defense of human rights; without Soviet pro-
tection, the Poles would stand alone before the Germans.
To this plausible argument to public international law,39 Molotov,
Foreign Commissar since the spring of 1939, added the justification of
"progressive intervention"4 on behalf of revolution and Communism.
Thus the Soviets claimed they were saving the Poles from both Nazis
and capitalists. As a last item in their apologia, the Soviets argued that
annexing the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia corrected an
(1963) (norm of use of force only for self-defense weak before 1939 but breaches of duty do
not destroy duty).
34. See A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 219-21, 232, 238, 257-58.
35. The Treaty and Secret Protocol are printed in 7 AKTEN ZUR DEUTSCHEN
AUSWAXR GEN PoLrrM: 1918-1935, SERIE D, Nos. 228-29 (1956); A. ULAM, supra note 10,
at 276-97. See generally C. THORNE, THE APPROACH OF WAR, 1938-39 173-74 (1967).
36. Of course, Stalin acted as if he believed the Pact would prevent war. Soviet surprise
at the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 is well documented. J. TmisKA & R.
SLUSSER, supra note 17, at 253-56; A. SEATON, THE RUSso-GERMAN WAR 98-103 (1970).
37. The phrase is Potemkin's (Deputy Foreign Commissar). See A. ULAM, supra note
10, at 258; J. TRIsKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 17, at 253-56.
38. See Ginsburgs, A Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Law: Eastern Poland
in 1939, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 76-78 (1958).
39. See generally id at 69-84.




injustice in the 1921 Treaty of Rigal and brought national self-deter-
mination to ethnic Russians by reuniting otherwise divided nationali-
ties.42 A plebiscite confirmed the Soviet annexations. Though it did
not take place under international supervision and consequently re-
mains at least debatable as a valid act of legitimation, the vote helped
Soviet image-makers and contributed to successful propaganda.43
Soviet arguments on behalf of the attack on Finland in 1939 did not
produce the same result. Squeezed by both Germany and the Soviet
Union in October, 1939, the smaller Baltic States had agreed to Soviet
demands for military bases. Stalin focused on Finland because its east-
ern border passed close to Leningrad. Exasperated by the Finnish re-
fusal to accept territorial exchanges that would have moved the frontier
west, the Soviet Union substituted military for diplomatic pressure. A
"frontier incident" occurred on November 26; war began on November
29. On December 1 the Soviet Union recognized as legitimate a Finn-
ish communist government set up on the Soviet border. The Finnish
communists agreed to Soviet proposals for territorial exchanges on De-
cember 2.44
The Soviet interpretation of these events insisted that Finland had
committed aggression and that the Soviet Union had acted only in self-
defense. 45 Germany posed the only European threat to the Soviet
Union, and this fact increased the strategic importance of the Baltic
States. But any argument that strategic necessity justified expansion at
Finland's expense would publicize Soviet skepticism about the 1939
Pact with Hitler, and, indeed, Hitler's intentions. Moscow's fear of pro-
voking a German attack on the Soviet Union prevented Stalin from
invoking such a defense of the attack on Finland. He therefore fell
back on the claim of self-defense, which was difficult to believe,46 and,
on December 14, 1939, the League Council expelled the Soviet Union
41. Id at 79 (Treaty of Riga ended Russo-Polish War and set boundary that survived
until 1939). See generally P. WANDYCZ, SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS 283-86 (1969).
42. Ginsburgs, supra note 38, at 77, 78-79.
43. Id at 80.
44. See M. BELOFF, 2 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RussIA 305-7 (1949); Ulam,
supra note 10, at 287, 289-92. See generally M. JAKOBSON, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WIN-
TER WAR (1961); E. ENGLE & L. PAANAREN, THE WINTER WAR (1973).
45. See J. TRIsKA & R. SLUSSER, supra note 17, at 274.
46. The headline of the Daily Worker, Dec. 1, 1939, perhaps was unintentionally ironic:
'Red Army Hurls Back Invading Finnish Troops, Crosses Frontier." The Soviets have in-
sisted that their behavior in Finland was a legal exercise of their inherent right of self-
defense. Having rejected Soviet exhortations to strengthen and defend the League Cove-
nant, the western powers had conspired to drive Germany eastwards. Stalin thwarted their
plan with the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany and bought time and strategic space by
incursions into Poland and Finland. As a result the Soviet Union was able to resist the
Nazis when they attacked in 1941. See, e.g., J. TRIsKA & R. SLussER, supra note 17, at 255.
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for aggression.47
In the Soviet view, the thirties' experience confirmed that interna-
tional law existed only as a temporary compromise between Capitalism
and Communism. This theory left room for the existence of regions
governed by different international laws should several communist
States one day exist.48
B. The development ofpeaceful coexistence in theory
andpractice, 1945-1956
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union occupied
more territory and exerted greater influence than Russia had done at
any time since 1815. Soviet foreign policy continued to include both
national and revolutionary themes.49 The two came together in the es-
tablishment of communist governments in Poland, Rumania, and Hun-
gary, and later in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and
China. A communist "world" now existed.
Whereas the Soviets' principal concern before 1945 was to preserve
and strengthen the State inherited from Lenin, after the war they con-
fronted the triple problem of retaining authority, rebuilding the Soviet
Union, and dominating the socialist world that had come into being.
47. M. BELOFF, supra note 44, at 308. The strategic argument, of course, would have
contradicted Soviet doctrine regarding membership in the Union. See text accompanying
notes 18-22 supra.
48. See id at 395; Shapiro, The Soviet Concept of International Law, 1948 Y.B. WORLD
AFF. 274-76; 309-10; Krylov, supra note 7, at 415, 432-35 (appearance of Soviet State meant
traditional international law lost absolute character, idea of world law seeks capitalist
supremacy and is reactionary); Tunkin, Peaceful Coexistence and International Law in CON-
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 30-31,(G. Tunkin ed. 1969). G. TUNKIN, supra note 7,
at 238-39; I. LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS SOVIETIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 64-79
(views of Lenin, Stalin, Korovin, Pashukanis, and others up to 1930), 80-103 (1930-38), 123-
59 (1938-54) (1954).
49. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, for example, Stalin insisted on regaining the Kurile
Islands and Southern Sakhalin in return for entering the war against Japan. His position
reflected a desire to defend strategic interests by territorial acquisitions and was presented in
terms of redressing the losses of territory that had occurred in the nineteenth century and as
a result of the Russo-Japanese War. Stalin also argued that the acquisitions were necessary
to make the Russian people understand why the Soviet Union was attacking Japan. See
DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE CONFERENCES OF
MALTA AND YALTA 769 (1955) (minutes of meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin, Feb. 8,
1945); id at 381-83 (memorandum on territorial problems in regard to Japan, Dec. 28, 1944);
id at 896 (draft memorandum by Stalin on political conditions for Soviet entry into war
against Japan); id at 984 (agreement in regard to Soviet entry into Pacific war, Feb. 11,
1945). See also H. FEIS, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN 254-56, 511 n.17 (1957); D.
CLEMEN S, YALTA 249-52 (1970). Stalin's position and argument were inconsistent with his
own insistence on self-determination by communist parties as prerequisites for territorial
accessions to the Soviet Union, see text accompanying note 22 supra, and, for example, with
Khrushchev's later advocacy of a treaty forbidding border changes through the use of force.
See note 59 infra.
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Tito's resistance to Soviet commands in 1948 revealed the problem of
governing a group of communist countries in a world system that ex-
plicitly claimed it was based on the principle of the sovereignty and
equality of States.50 Additional political and doctrinal tests came in
1956, three years after Stalin's death. These incidents sharply and pub-
licly illuminated the difficulty of reconciling political-strategic interests
with the universal international law of the U.N. Charter.
Articulating a Soviet theory of international law that performed this
reconciliation became part of the "de-Stalinization" program put for-
ward at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (C.P.S.U.) in 1956. At that Congress, Khrushchev proposed,
and the Party agreed, that the five vague principles of peaceful coexis-
tence listed in the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet of April 29, 195451
should be the foundation for peaceful relations among all States.5 2 The
doctrine of inevitable war between Communism and Capitalism had
died when confronted by atomic weapons. 53
Though Soviet theorists prefer treaties to custom as a source of inter-
national law,54 they have argued that peaceful coexistence represents a
principle of law simply because it describes the reality of Soviet rela-
tions with the bourgeois world since 1917. 55 This description suggests
the existence of agreement, even tacit agreement, between States about
rules of conduct and agreements acquire the force of international law
50. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift had an enormous impact on the communist bloc but did
not contribute in the same way as the Hungarian affair to the development of Soviet doc-
trines of international law. See generally I. LAPENNA, STATE AND LAW (1964); A. ULAM,
supra note 10, at 461-70; R. HIGGINS, supra note 13, at 125-27 (1965).
51. Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India,
Apr. 29, 1954, India-People's Republic of China, 299 U.N.T.S. 70. The Preamble to the
Treaty provides for: "(1) [m]utual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mu-
tual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equal-
ity and mutual benefits, (5) peaceful co-existence." See R. HIGGINS, supra note 13, at 104;
Ramundo, Czechoslovakia and the Law of Peaceful Coexistence: Legal Characterization in
the Soviet NationalInterest, 22 STAN. L. REv. 963, 966 (1970); Lipson, Peaceful Coexistence,
in THE SOVIET IMPACr ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 26, at 28-32 (origin and content
of peaceful coexistence).
52. See R. HIGGINS, supra note 13, at 105.
53. See F. HINSLEY, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYS-
TEM (lectures in New Zealand, 1980) (copy on file with The Yale Journal of World Public
Order).
54. See, e.g., G. TUNKIN,,supra note 7, at 133-47; Krylov, supra note 7, 436-43; I.
LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS SOVIETIQUES DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 125-32 (definitions
of international law by Vyshinski, Dudenevski, Krylov, Korovin, and others), 160-70
(sources of international law) (1954); B. RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 60-64 (1967)
(short summary of Soviet views); Shapiro, supra note 48, at 273 (Soviet theorists insist on
consent as basis of international law).
55. See G. TUNKIN, supra note 7, at 49-57; E. McWHNNEY, "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"
AND SOVIET WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1964).
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despite differences in ideology and economic organization.5 6 This
analysis makes peaceful coexistence consistent with the Soviet empha-
sis on treaties as the principal source of international law57 and forms
the structure of the Soviet argument for the legal character of peaceful
coexistence. Like the emphasis on treaties, it leaves the Soviet govern-
ment in control of the substance and definition of the law thus created.
In 1961, Khrushchev defined peaceful coexistence as a "form of in-
tensive, economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat
against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international
arena.158 These words are central to the Marxist lexicon and have be-
come part of the language in which argument about the nature of inter-
national politics and law is couched. By using them to express an
important element in Soviet doctrine on the law governing the use of
force, Khrushchev tried to change the terms in which that law is under-
stood.5 9 He implicitly claimed for the Soviet government the role of
ultimate judge of what is and is not a legal use of force.60
II. The Evolution of the Brezhnev Doctrine
From Moscow's perspective, events in 1956 appeared to threaten the
political and strategic status quo in eastern Europe. Soviet leaders felt
compelled to respond to what happened in Poland and, particularly,
Hungary, and to justify their response.
Turbulence in Poland and Hungary formed part of a process of "self-
criticism" 6 1 that spread throughout the communist world in 1956. The
C.P.S.U. itself gave the lead in February, 1956 when the Central Com-
56. See, e.g., G. TuNKN, supra note 8, at 59.
57. See G. TuNKIN, supra note 7, at 91-113; B. RAMUNDO, supra note 54, at 50-60.
58. Speech by N. Khrushchev, supra note 23, at 265.
59. Consistently with his emphasis on non-military competition, at the end of 1963
Khrushchev proposed a multilateral treaty renouncing the use of force to alter existing
boundaries. He recommended that the signatories make "a firm declaration that neither
difference in social and political system, nor non-recognition, nor absence of diplomatic
relations, nor any other pretext shall justify violation by one state of the territorial integrity
of another." N.S. Khrushchov'r Message to all Heads of State, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(Moscow) Feb., 1964, at 7 (message dated Dec. 31, 1963). He explicitly referred to the U.N.
Charter as providing the principles and mechanism for resolving territorial disputes. Noth-
ing came of his proposal.
60. See speech by N. Khrushchev, supra note 23, at 262-63, 267-68 (wars result from
class divisions and are caused by imperialists; communists stand for peace); Brezhnev,
Speech to the 26th C.P.S. U. Congress, Feb. 23,1981, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A6, col. 1
(city ed.) (excerpts; communist governments seek to bridle arms race, strengthen peace and
dktente, and defend sovereign rights and freedom of nations. Capitalists oppose these goals,
interfere in other countries' internal affairs, and suppress liberation struggle).
61. Extracts from the Report of the Central Committee to the Twentieth Party Congress of
the C.P.S. U., in DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1956 360, 363 (1959) [hereinafter




mittee denounced Stalin's leadership as a "cult of the individual" 62 and
Khrushchev, the Party Chairman, condemned certain of Stalin's
crimes.63 Apparently accepting some pluralism within the communist
movement, the Central Committee approvingly quoted Lenin's obser-
vation that "[a]ll nations will arrive at socialism-this is inevitable, but
not all will do so in exactly the same way, each will contribute some-
thing of its own in one or another form of democracy, one or another
variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one or another rate at
which socialist transformations will be effected in the various aspects of
social life."64 Tolerant reference to the different Yugoslav and Chinese
roads to Socialism followed. 65
A. Poland, 1956
Viewing Soviet anti-Stalinism, moderate though it were, as tolerant
of change played a role in Poland, where rioting over economic condi-
tions broke out in June, 1956. The June riots precipitated the replace-
ment of the government's leading figures. Gomulka became First
Secretary of the Polish Communist Party on October 21. He had been
expelled from the Party and jailed for Titoism and, as a result, had
become a popular national figure.66 Once in power, he announced eco-
nomic and agricultural reforms while stressing Poland's fidelity to its
alliance with Moscow and the principle of communist party supremacy.
The Soviet Union worried that its ally would cease to be a commu-
nist State under Soviet influence. Soviet-Polish discussions on October
17 were acrimonious and Soviet intervention appeared possible. But
the Poles-anti-communists and communists alike-rallied to the new
administration. They helped confront Moscow with a stable situation
where everybody in a leadership position proclaimed his loyalty to the
communist government and ideology. Reinforcing the impression of
national solidarity behind Gomulka, Marshal Rokossovsky, the Polish
Minister of Defense, reported to Moscow that his army was unreliable
from the Soviet point of view.67 After much debate and several menac-
ing exchanges with Gomulka's government, Khrushchev and his col-
62. I'd at 363.
63. See introduction to the 20th C.P.S. U. Report, supra note 61, at 356 (editor's
commentary).
64. 20th C.P.S. U. Report, supra note 61, at 360. Brezhnev made much the same point on
Feb. 23, 1981. See note 60 supra.
65. 20th C.P.S.U. Report, supra note 61, at 361.
66. See A. ULM, supra note 10, at 582.
67. See Barraclough, Poland and Hungary, in SURvEY OF INTERNATiO4tAL AFFAIRS:
1956-1958 86 (G. Barraclough ed. 1962). See generally id at 84-97.
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leagues accepted the new situation in Poland.68
Perhaps because of their long history of Russian domination, the
Poles appeared almost instinctively to know how to oppose their So-
viet-backed government without directly challenging the framework in
which that government operated. Blessed with groups within the party
and government struggling for power while riiaintaining Poland's rela-
tionship with the Warsaw Pact, the Poles found a middle path between
indifference and revolution. The Soviet Union did not invade the
country or overturn the government.69 By contrast, the Soviets found
the changes in Hungary to be intolerably radical. 70
B. Hungary, 1956
Developments in Poland had an explosive rather than pedagogical
impact on Hungary. Hungarian students meeting on October 22 voted
a sixteen point program, calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Hungary,71 free elections, and a multiparty political system.72
Though they frankly acknowledged the example offered by Warsaw's
change of government, the Hungarian demands went beyond the Po-
lish model.73 The student demands led to anti-government demonstra-
tions throughout Budapest. Violence broke out after Erno Gero, First
Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, gave an un-
compromising speech during the evening of October 23. Shots were
68. The Chinese later claimed that they had advocated accommodating Gomulka and
destroying Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of Hungary, and that their advice carried the day.
Invading Poland, Beijing had said, would pit communist governments against each other.
Invading Hungary, on the other hand, was necessary to suppress a counter-revolutionary
government. See E. CRANKSHAW, KHRUSHCHEV 242 (1966); N. KHRUSHCHEV,
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS 419 n. 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS].
69. See generall, Barraclough, supra note 67, at 72, 74-76, 96-97 (1962). The present
crisis in Poland shows that, for the time being (Jan., 1982), the Poles have lost their ability to
reform their system without provoking repression while the Soviet Union retained its ability
to act indirectly.
70. Unlike the Poles, in 1956 the Hungarians sought changes that would have made
transformed Hungary into a non-communist State. (The contrast between Polish aims for
reform in 1956 and those in 1980-1981 is as dramatic. See Darnton, Communism and.Better
Lffe Poles Found Wait Too Long, N.Y. times, Dec. 14, 1981, at Al, col. 3 (city ed.)). The
Hungarian Journalists' Union signaled this ambition by referring to Mao's Hundred Flow-
ers' speech as a model. (In an unpublished speech to the Supreme State Conference on May
2, 1956, Mao Zedong said: "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought
contend." Macdougall, 7he Chinese People's Republic, in SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AF-
FAIRS: 1956-1958 250 (G. Barraclough ed. 1962)).
. 71. Units of the Soviet Army were in Hungary pursuant to the Warsaw Pact. See speech
by (Foreign Minister) Shepilov in the General Assembly (Nov. 19, 1956), 11 U.N. GAOR
(582d plen. mtg.) at 110, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 582 (1956).
72. See Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, U.N. GAOR,
11th Sess., Supp. (No. 18) 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/3592 (1957) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Report].
73. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 98.
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fired at demonstrators and people were killed. Gero's speech, in which
he characterized the situation as involving a choice between "a socialist
democracy and a bourgeois democracy," 74 had made him the target of
popular wrath; he rejected all policy changes.
The shooting into crowds ignited an armed uprising.75 Both commu-
nists and their opponents wanted change. Indecision and weakness
governed; civil war appeared likely. At that moment, Soviet army units
already in Hungary helped to restore order. This action constituted the
first Soviet military intervention.76 Forces'that had been on alert and
preparing to act since at least October 2077 entered Budapest early in
the morning of October 24. Tito afterwards criticized the first interven-
tion as inexcusable; it inflamed public feeling and sapped whatever le-
gitimacy the government possessed.78 On the other hand, if it resulted
from an appeal by Gero79 the intervention was legal. International law
always has recognized one State's right to appeal to another for mili-
tary assistance against revolution.80
These events, which so quickly escaped government control, drove
Gero and his colleagues from power. On October 24, the Hungarian
Communist Party leaders made Imre Nagy Prime Minister."' By the
74. Radio address by Erno Gero (Oct. 23, 1956), in NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND POPU-
LAR REVOLT IN EASTERN EUROPE 407 (P. Zinner ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL
COMMUNISM]; D.I.A. 1956, supra note 61, at 446.
75. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 99-101; U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 6.
76. Resistance to the Soviets was fierce. U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 7. The U.N.
Committee investigating events in Hungary noted that no evidence of an invitation had
turned up. Id at 39. On Nov. 11, Tito blamed Gero for asking for Soviet help. Speech by
Tito (Nov. 11, 1956), in D.I.A. 1956, supra note 61, at 506. Barraclough also believed that
the Gero government invited Russian intervention. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 101.
See also P. ZrNNER, REvoLUTION IN HUNGARY 255-56 (1962) (Gero called for help some-
time during the evening of Oct. 31.)
77. See U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 23-24.
78. Speech by Tito, supra note 76, at 506-07. Gero had visited Tito on Oct. 22-23. Tito
did not try to make Nagy share responsibility for requesting Soviet intervention although
the Hungarian authorities did so on Oct. 24. See U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 6-7; Bar-
raclough, supra note 67, at 102.
79. Barraclough, supra note 67, at 101; Speech by Tito, supra note 76, at 505-06; P. ZIN-
NER, supra note 76, at 255.
80. See generally, M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 192n.164, 244-60 (1961); E. ROSToW, THE IDEAL IN LAW 263-95 (1978). But see I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 321-27, who finds the law full of ambiguities, as does Ar~chaga,
Inernational Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 HAGUE RcUEIL 1, 94-100, 138-39
(1979).
81. More Titoist than Gomulka, Nagy owed his popularity to his opposition to forced
collectivization of agriculture in the forties and to his absence from power while Stalinists
governed Hungary. Appointing Nagy associated him with Soviet intervention and en-
couraged members of the incumbent government to hope that they could retain power.
Their calculations were wrong. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 102; NATIONAL COMMU-
NISM, supra note 74, at 464; A. FoNTAn E, 2 HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 186 (1969).
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end of October, rioting had become revolution.82 In the streets of Bu-
dapest, mobs hunted and lynched communists because of their posi-
tion, party affiliation, or both. Revolution spread to most of the
provinces, which then threw off government control. 83 The Soviet gov-
ernment became convinced that Gero and his colleagues, backed by
Red Army units already in Hungary, were incapable of restoring order.
Afraid of letting events take their course, the Soviets forced Gero to
resign as Party chief;84 Janos Kadar became the new First Secretary of
the Hungarian Communist Party and Deputy Prime Minister under
Nagy. 5 Six well-known non-communists also joined the new Cabinet
announced on October 27.
These changes proved wholly insufficient to stop the revolution.
Probably no liberal government could have reestablished order fast
enough to prevent a Soviet invasion, and Nagy was unable to exhibit as
much strength as Gomulka had shown in Poland. Nagy lacked both
the character and the cohesive following necessary to copy the Polish
pattern. 86
Probably as an effort to reassert control over events, on October 30
the Soviet government announced its views on relations with socialist
governments. On the one hand, the Soviet Union offered to re-examine
the status of Soviet forces stationed in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania
under the Warsaw Pact. De-Stalinization required new Warsaw Pact
military arrangements and adjustments in relations between commu-
nist parties as well. On the other hand, the Soviet statement concluded
that any changes had to strengthen Socialism.
The defence of the Socialist gains of People's Democratic Hungary is to-
day the chief and sacred obligation of the workers, peasants and intellec-
tuals, of all Hungarian working people. The Soviet Government
expresses confidence that the peoples of the socialist countries will not
allow external and internal reactionary forces to shake the foundations of
the people's democratic system, won and reinforced by the selfless strug-
gle and labour of the workers, peasants and intellectuals of each
82. See U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 137 (revolution spontaneous); Barraclough, supra
note 67, at 113, 133 (grudging agreement with U.N. Report); Speech by (Foreign Minister)
Shepilov in the General Assembly, supra note 71, at 109-12 (blamed United States, imperial-
ists, and counter-revolutionary emigres).
83. Secret radios broadcast anti-government exhortations; the border with Austria was
open; by the end of the month local revolutionary groups had formed a Transdanubian
National Council. Radio Free Europe, which enjoyed American government funding, in-
cautiously gave Hungarians hope of foreign assistance. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at
102-05, 113; U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 14, 17-18.
84. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 104.
85. See id at 104, 106.





Conciliatory though its tone certainly was, the Soviet statement held
to the attitude articulated in a letter to other communist parties.
The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. considers that it remains the 'di-
recting party' among all the Communist organizations of the world. Each
Communist party is judged in the light of the more or less intimate rela-
tions which it has with the Soviet Communist Party, for the interests of
the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. are closely tied in with those of the
other sister parties and similarly the evolution of the Soviet Communist
Party could not be considered as an individual and distinct
phenomenon.88
Nationalism, if it meant building Socialism "without liaison with the
socialist countries,"8 9 was as unacceptable as the notion that an ideol-
ogy other than Marxism-Leninism could provide a basis 'for communist
parties. The Soviet letter stressed the need to reexamine Marxist-Len-
inist principles "in the light of historical developments," 90 but left the
reader to decide what the Kremlin really had in mind.
In addition to creating an argument like the justification for Lenin's
nationalities policy,91 these messages appear designed to articulate
principles broad enough to accommodate to Soviet acceptance of
events in Poland and rejection of the Hungarian upheaval. They left
the Soviet government to judge not only the wisdom, but also the
Marxist-Leninist "rightness" of decisions or events.
The Hungarians ignored the warnings implicit in the Soviet state-
ment. Events at the end of October produced hammer-blows to Mos-
cow's political psyche, and transformed the October 30 communiqu6
into a program for action. On the 30th, Nagy's government abolished
the political monopoly of the Communist Party, withdrew Hungary
from the Warsaw Pact, and declared Hungary's neutrality. Soviet
troops sent to restore the communist order fraternized with Hungarian
revolutionaries; some soldiers were unwilling to suppress anti-commu-
nist demonstrations, and, in some cases, fought and died on the Hun-
garian side.92 Unlike Poland, Hungary seemed poised to set an
87. Declaration of the Soviet government on the foundations for the development and
further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other
socialist States (Oct. 30, 1956), reprinted in D.I.A. 1956, supra note 61, at 465; 468.
88. Roberts, Soviet Letter to Satellites Stresses "Intimacy" with the Party at Moscow,
Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1956, at A5, col. 2 (text of letter). On the authority and background of
the letter, see D.I.A. 1956, supra note 61, at 426 (editor's commentary).
89. Roberts, supra note 88.
90. Id
91. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
92. See U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 25.
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example all the people's Democracies could follow. 93
Before intervening, the Soviet government articulated limits it would
enforce as to political changes in "socialist countries." Yet, the October
30 statement was more than a political manifesto; it sketched the argu-
ment the Soviet Union would use to defend the legality of the policy
adopted. The statement resembled a brief on the lawful use of force by
States.
The Soviet legal case for military action to destroy the Nagy govern-
ment and suppress the Hungarian revolution included more than the
points made on October 30. Once determined to overthrow Nagy, the
Soviets wanted an invitation with which to justify their intervention.
Just as in 1939-1940 Stalin had created an alternative communist Finn-
ish regime with which to squeeze the established government and had
nurtured the Lublin Poles during the Second World War as a replace-
ment for the Polish government-in-exile, 94 so in 1956 Khrushchev ex-
ploited divisions in Nagy's government and helped establish a new
Hungarian government to compete with, and replace the existing cabi-
net. On November 1, Janos Kadar announced the dissolution of the
old and formation of a new Hungarian Communist Party.95 Kadar
then disappeared from view and on November 4 broadcast that he had
formed a new communist government. According to Kadar, counter-
revolutionary exploitation of Nagy's weakness justified this otherwise
extraordinary action against his colleague. 96
Kadar claimed legitimacy for his government. On November 1,
Nagy had appealed for discussion of the Hungarian situation by the
U.N. General Assembly.97 On the 4th, Kadar asked that Nagy's appeal
93. If the Soviet Union tolerated or accepted change in the structure of government in
Budapest, then Moscow would lose all ideological reason to maintain the communist dicta-
torship. This fact probably brought the Soviet leadership to decide on the invasion of Hun-
gary. In comparison, any anxieties about changes in the balance of power or the Soviet
image probably were insignificant. But see Barraclough, supra note 67, at 115, 116-17, 131
(emphasizes change in balance of power).
94. See A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 361-62; 376.
95. Kadar probably was too committed a communist to accept the pluralism explicit in
Nagy's program. See U.N. Report, supra note 72, at 43-44 (views expressed by Kadar dur-
ing first week of Nov., 1956); Janos Kadar-4 Profile, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct.,
1956, at 15-18.
96. Radio appeal by Ferenc Munnich, Janos Kadar, et al. (Nov. 4, 1956), in NATIONAL
COMMUNISM, supra note 74, at 473 (announcing formation of Hungarian Revolutionary
Worker-Peasant Government); Program and composition of the Revolutionary Worker-
Peasant Government in id at 474-78 (announcement by Kadar, Nov. 4, 1956) [hereinafter
cited as Kadar Program] at 473-78; Barraclough, supra note 67, at 120-22 (Kadar's disap-
pearance from view Nov. 1-7, 1956 and broadcast on the wavelength used by headquarters
of Soviet army in Hungary).




be ignored as lacking "legal force." 98 He apparently requested Soviet
assistance in overthrowing Nagy and the revolution although Soviet
forces had already been in action for five days.99 Resolutions of the
U.N. General Assembly condemning Soviet actions as violations of
both the Charter and "accepted standards and principles of interna-
tional law, justice and morality" 1°° had no effect. On November 2 the
Soviet Union vetoed Security Council consideration of the Hungarian
question. 101
C. The Hungarian Crisis and the Development of Soviet Doctrine
From the Soviet perspective, events in 1956 contained themes char-
acteristic of European and world history since 1917: the uniqueness of
the socialist system; the unending, omnipresent struggle between capi-
talists and socialists; the special place in socialist affairs enjoyed by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and the correctness of Soviet
decisions. Tunkin summarized, as self-evidently correct, the Soviet
view in his general work on international law.
The Soviet state, as the 'oldest' socialist state whose historic fate has been
the most difficult task of paving the way for a new socio-economic forma-
tion, always precisely fulfills its duties arising from the principle of social-
ist internationalism. A vivid manifestation of this policy is the assistance
of the Soviet Union to the Hungarian people in 1956 and the assistance,
together with other socialist countries, to the people of Czechoslovakia in
1968 in protecting socialist gains and, ultimately in defending their sover-
11 U.N. GAOR, Second Emergency Special Session, Annex (Agenda Item 5) 1, U.N. Doc.
A/3251 (1956).
98. Cablegram dated Nov. 4, 1956 from Janos Kadar addressed to the Secretary-Gen-
eral, I 1 U.N. GAOR, Second Emergency Special Session, Annex (Agenda Item 5) 3, U.N.
Doc. A/3311 (1956).
99. Kadar Program, supra note 96, at 478; appeal by the Command of Soviet troops in
Hungary to the Hungarian people (Nov. 5, 1956), in NATIONAL COMMUNISM, supra note 71,
at 480; Kiralyi, Budapest: 1956-Prague: 1968, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, July-Oct., 1969, at
52, 5 8-59; Barraclough, supra note 67, at 121 (Soviet troops converging on Hungary Oct. 30-
31 and fanning out across country Nov. 1, 1956).
Soviet forces met and without difficulty crushed Hungarian opposition. Nagy was subse-
quently, and secretly, executed for treason. P. ZINNER, supra note 76, at 352. Shepilov, the
Soviet Foreign Minister, interpreted these events as a response to counter-revolution and
renascent Fascism. Speech by (Foreign Minister) Shepilov in the General Assembly, supra
note 71 at 111-12. See generally KHRUSHCHEv REMEMBERS, supra note 68, at 416; 427-29; I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 317-18; G. TUNKiN, supra note 7, at 435.
100. G.A. Res. 1006 (ES-Il), 11 U.N. GAOR, Second Emergency Special Session, An-
nex (Agenda Item 5) 7, U.N. Doec. A/RES/398 (1956). The General Assembly approved
resolutions condemning Soviet action and appealing for withdrawals on Nov. 4 and 9. GA
Res. 1004 (ES-II) 11 U.N. GAOR, Second Emergency Special Session, Annex (Agenda Item
5) 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/393 (1956); 1005 (ES-Il) 11 U.N. GAOR, Second Emergency Spe-
cial Session, Annex (Agenda Item 5) 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1005 (1956).
101. See Barraclough, supra note 67, at 119.
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eignty and independence from sudden swoops of imperialism, as well as
the assistance to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against United
States's [sic] aggression. 102
At far greater length in 1957, the Soviet government defended its
actions as having been provoked by counter-revolutionaries who, sup-
ported by the United States, tried to undermine East-West dtenfe and
the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship. The effort to argue that Soviet
political decisions conformed to international law showed how impor-
tant it had become for a State to claim that its uses of force were legal.
Rather than simply declare, as Dean Acheson later suggested, that
"[tihe survival of states is not a matter of law"' 0 3 and that the Hun-
garian revolution threatened the Soviet State, Moscow refused to rely
on unilateral security decisions and felt obliged to invoke law as justi-
fying its position.
Such behavior showed the impact on State conduct of world wars,
revolutions, political events, and advances in military technology in
this century. It also revealed the importance of Soviet coauthorship of
the rules limiting the right to use force in an international context.' 04
Soviet words indicated understanding that the long tradition by which
sovereign States legally could make war for any reason, even no reason,
had come to an end. 05 For a society in which law played a relatively
insignificant role "as an organizing principle"'0 6 this development was
of major importance. 107
The Soviet Union emerged from the Hungarian crisis with a mature
102. G. TuNKIN, supra note 7, at 435-36. Though this brief account is, given what we
know, implausible (see the description of Hungarian resistance to Soviet forces in U.N. Re-
port, supra note 72, at 29-33), versions of it appear in some of the western literature. See
Barraclough, supra note 67, at 122-24 (sympathy for Soviet anxieties as communicated in
official apologies); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 33, at 317-18 (simultaneous condemnation of
invasion as illegal and apparent toleration of it).
103. Acheson, Remarkl, 1963 PROc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 13, 14 (1963).
104. A story, perhaps apocryphal, has Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko remarking that
if the San Francisco Conference of 1945 had been held in 1946 agreement would have been
impossible to achieve.
105. F. HINSLEY, supra note 53.
106. Lipson, Socialist Legaliy: The Road Uphill, in RussIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV 444,
447 (A. Brumberg ed. 1962).
107. Some observers regard it as no more than the homage paid by vice to virtue (LA
ROUCHEFOUCAULD, Riflexions morales No. 218, in MAXMES 87 (F. Green ed. 1946)). For
example, in his first press conference as President of the United States, Ronald Reagan said:
I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution and including the present
leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various Communist Congresses
they hold, their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolu-
tion and a one world Socialist or Communist state-whichever word you choose. Now,
as long as they do that and as long as they, at the same time, have openly and publicly
declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause: meaning




theory of the law governing the international use of force. A Soviet
sphere of influence in eastern Europe had existed since 1945. Now
Moscow had proclaimed and applied the rules by which that sphere
was defined and governed. The Soviet Communist Party was primus
interpares and the Soviet Union could use force to regulate its relations
with other communist States and to keep communist governments in
power.
In its style of exposition, this interpretation of international law sug-
gested general applicability. But by emphasizing social systems,
revolution, and gains for Socialism, the Soviet Union used language
lacking authority in the U.N. Charter or traditional analyses of interna-
tional relations and international law. The Charter, for example, in-
sists that States comprise the international system and determine the
character of the law governing the international use of force.
Soviet acknowledgement of this reality is uneven. In the context of
relations between the Soviet Union and communist States in eastern
Europe, the Soviets apply their theory of the lawful use of force to jus-
tify their positions with regard to "national liberation movements" and
"wars of national liberation" whenever they occur. The Soviet view
thus transcends geographical limits to compete with traditional con-
cepts of international law as a theory of world order.108
III. The Brezhnev Doctrine and Peaceful Coexistence
After Hungary, Soviet analysts argued first that peaceful coexistence
governing relations between Capitalism and Communism represented
"an objective necessity" 10 9 and, second, that its principles were princi-
ples of law. In 1961, for example, the Twenty-second Soviet Commu-
nist Party Congress posited "disastrous war" and peaceful coexistence
as "the alternative offered by history." 110
According to the C.P.S.U. program, peaceful coexistence includes
theoretical and operational dimensions. It
implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes,
and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and
trust between countries; consideration for each other's interests; non-in-
terference in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every people to
obtain that and that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of
standards.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at A10, col. 2 (city ed.).
108. See generally G. TtNKIN, supra note 7, at 427-28.
109. THE NEw SoviET SocIETY 104 (H. Ritvo ed. 1962) (program adopted by the 22nd
C.P.S.U. Congress in Oct., 1961).
110. Id (footnote omitted).
229
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
solve all the problems of their country by themselves; strict respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of eco-
nomic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mu-
tual benefit."'
As an operational guide, peaceful coexistence both acts "as a basis for
the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an inter-
national scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between
them."'112 In the Soviet view, peaceful coexistence is consistent with
supporting "the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just
anti-imperialist wars of liberation." 13
Soviet writers such as Tunkin subsequently elevated this presenta-
tion of world politics to the level of law. Tunkin argued that these
"principles" form the basis for the U.N. Charter and contemporary in-
ternational law as confirmed by State practice. In his view, peaceful
coexistence means that neither social system will use force to increase
its area of control." 4 He thus would grant legal status to the world
political division into eastern and western blocs.' 15
A. Czechoslovakia, 1968
The Czech crisis of 1968 produced a new and clear articulation of
Soviet policy regarding the legal use of force in international relations.
Apart from the political dimensions of the affair-the impact on East-
West relations, on relations among communist parties, and on the
Third World's view of the Soviet Union' 16-the invasion of August 20
111. Id
112. Id at 105.
113. Id at 107. Where this formulation applies only to anti-colonialist wars, it has been
defended as a principle of law, although it is freighted with difficulty. See generally, Tyner,
Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 234
(1979); Vance, Jr., Recognition ,as an Affirmative Step in the De-colonization Process: The
Case of Western Sahara, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 45 (1980). Soviet support of North
Korea, North Vietnam after 1954, and various "liberation movements" in Latin America
has been justified as furthering anti-imperialism although colonial empires no longer existed
in those regions. See THE NEw SOVIET SOCIETY, supra note 109, at 100-07; P. BEROMANN,
SELF-DETERMINATION 74-75 (1972) (pseud. for political reasons; scholarly credentials certi-
fied by Prof. John N. Hazard, Columbia University, at 12).
Tunkin has argued that international law is non-ideological. It is the law of peaceful
coexistence between the "irreconcilable" socialist and capitalist ideologies. Tunkin, supra
note 48, at 24.
114. See G. TUNKIN, sufpra note 7, at 69-75. For a similar argument, see Karpov, The
Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and its Implications for International Law, in THE
SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 26, at 14-15.
115. Cf. McDougal, Perspectivesfor an International Law of Human Dignity, in STUDIES
IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 987 (1960) (contemporary world consists of "a variety of 'interna-
tional' laws and anarchy of diverse, contending orders").
116. See J. VALENTA, SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968 160-64 (1979);




generated a more formal statement of the Soviet view than the Hun-
garian affair had done. It built on the positions constructed after the
Hungarian revolution and, since 1968, has been commonly referred to
in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Like the statement made in response to the Hungarian revolution of
1956, the Brezhnev Doctrine represented an answer to upheaval. But
events in 1968 did not follow the Hungarian pattern sufficiently to al-
low the Soviet government to copy Khrushchev's scenario.
The Czech Communist Party itself undertook the reforms eventually
rejected by Moscow and tolerated demonstrators demanding change.' 17
Antonin Novotny, the Party leader since 1953, had remained faithful to
Stalinism despite the Twentieth Party Congress and the reforms it sanc-
tioned. By 1968, he had overstayed his mandate. His long tenure and
unwavering conservatism made him a target for reformers seeking so-
lutions for economic stagnation 18 and desiring at least as much de-
Stalinization as the Soviet Union itself enjoyed. 119 The transnational,
almost millenial spirit of the sixties may also have acted as an impetus
to change. 120 On January 5, 1968 the Czech Communist Party replaced
Novotny with Alexander Dub~ek, who, at forty-six, was young, popu-
lar in the Party, and, as far as one could judge from previous behavior,
loyal to the U.S.S.R. 121 On March 22, Novotny resigned as President
of the country. Meanwhile, the Party Central Committee had author-
ized an Action Program for the government and Party. After much
public exhortation for reform, some of which appeared in the Party
newspaper, on April 5 the Committee adopted a document entitled
"The Czechoslovak Road to Socialism." The reform enterprise re-
ceived the sobriquet "Socialism with a Human Face." 122
To eastern and western observers alike,123 this program signaled that
Czechoslovakia was deviating from the Soviet model of Communism.
Czechoslovakia adopted legal and constitutional guaranties of freedom
of assembly, of expression, and of movement. Censorship ceased. 24
117. See Kiralyi, supra note 99, at 54-58.
118. See A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 739; J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 11-12.
119. See Kiralyi, supra note 99, at 53-54.
120. See generally, Labedz, Students and Revolution, 68 SURvEY 3 (1968); Grass, The
Lessons of Prague, 69 SutvEY 3 (1968); Labedz, Czechoslovakia and After, 69 SURvEY 7
(1968).
121. See A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 739.
122. See P. BERGMANN, supra note 113, at 20-21.
123. See generally WINTER IN PRAGUE (R. Remington ed. 1969) (documents on Czecho-
slovak liberalization and response by other communist parties); Labedz, Czechoslovakia and
After, 69 SuRvEY 7 (1968); J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 40-70. See also Are They Coming
or Going? THE ECONOMIST, July 20, 1968, at 15-16 (dilemma confronting U.S.S.R.).
124. See P. BERGMANN, supra note 113, at 22-23. Excerpts from the Action Program
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At all times during what became known as the Prague Spring, the Cen-
tral Committee and other organs of the Party and State supported the
Action Program. A minority in the Party and country opposed these
changes. 125 Though the Czechoslovak Communist Party tried to make
clear its fidelity to the Soviet Union and respect for Soviet security, 126
the Prague Spring aroused fear and hostility in the Warsaw Pact. No
longer reformers themselves, Gomulka and the Polish government saw
in Czech events a disease threatening their own system. 127 For similar
reasons, the East Germans outspokenly opposed the Dub~ek regime.
Kadar tried to mediate; the Rumanians and Yugoslavs (the latter
outside the Pact), as if feeling a renaissance of the ties of the Little
Entente, were openly sympathetic to Czechoslovakia. 128
The Soviet reaction to the Dub~ek government was decidedly nega-
tive. Moscow perceived in Prague's policies a threat to its leadership in
eastern Europe, and to the principle of proletarian dictatorship. 129 It
proved impossible to reconcile the Action Program with Warsaw Pact
insistence that pluralism isper se counter-revolutionary. 130 Faced by a
choice between permitting the antithesis of Communism and using
force to restore Communism, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia sup-
ported by token contingents from East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
and Bulgaria. 31
The invasion is a paradigm of applied Soviet political and legal doc-
trine regarding relations with other communist states and the lawful
use of force in an international context. Fearing that a Czechoslovakia
pushed "off the road of socialism"' 3 2 would jeopardize "the interests of
appear in 1969 Y.B. INT'L COMMUNIST AFF. 1025-27 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Action
Program].
125. See, e.g., J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 12 (formation of anti-reform group); 1969
Y.B. INT'L COMMUNIST AFF. 237.
126. See Action Program, supra note 124, at 1026; J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 74-76;
P. BERGMANN, supra note 113, at 28; Cf. SENIOR SPECIALISTS DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATING BE-
HAVIOR 437 (Comm. Print 1977) (prepared at the request of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs) (Czech reforms fundamentally threatened Soviet security interests thus justifying
Soviet response).
127. See 1969 Y.B. INT'L COMMUNIST AFF. 245-46 (protest against Czech sympathy for
student demonstrations in Warsaw).
128. Id; J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 135-36 (fear of "Communist Little Entente"
within Warsaw Pact). After World War I, the Little Entente grouped Yugoslavia, Czech-
slovakia, and Rumania in a series of defensive alliances designed as a bulwark against Hun-
gary, which was believed to covet the former parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
129. See, e.g., generaly, B. MEISSNER, DIE "BRESHNEW-DOKTRIN" 26 (1969).
130. See text accompanying notes 135-39 infra.
131. See A. ULAM, supra note 10, at 743.
132. Letter from the Soviet Politburo to the Central Committee of the Communist Party




the whole socialist system,"' 33 the Soviet Union and its allies argued
that international law allowed them to use force.134 Warsaw Pact offi-
cials claimed that their States were unalterably communist in political
structure and equally fixed as members of the Pact. Any attempt to
leave the Warsaw Pact, as in the case of Hungary in 1956, or to soften
the communist structure, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, could only re-
flect the work of capitalists and counter-revolutionaries. Whether in-
tentionally or not, the analysis almost tracked Stalin's argument for
solving the nationalities question after the 1917 Revolution. Thus, as
part of the public warning to the Czech Party in July, 1968, the even-
tual invaders declared that events in Czechoslovakia constituted
"something more than your own concern.' 3 5
At the cost of tremendous losses the peoples of our countries achieved
victory over Hitler fascism and won freedom and independence and the
opportunity to follow the path of progress and socialism. The frontiers of
the socialist world have moved to the centre of Europe, to the Elbe and
the Bohemian Forest. And we shall never agree to these historic gains of
socialism and the independence and security of our peoples being placed
in jeopardy. We shall never agree to imperialism, using peaceful or non-
peaceful methods, making a breach, from the inside or from the outside,
in the socialist system and changing the correlation of forces in Europe in
favour of imperialism.136
History had given the east European communist parties responsibility
to ensure "that the revolutionary gains are not lost."'1 37
Moscow invoked treaties based on "the common aspiration to defend
socialism and ensure the collective security of the socialist countries"'38
as a legal foundation for the invasion and ultimately defended Soviet
action as obedience to this treaty-law. Critics denounced the theory as
a doctrine of "limited sovereignty" and accused the U.S.S.R. itself of
imperialism. 139 The Soviet position seemed to deny States their
133. Id
134. Cf. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WoRD PoLrrcs 40-47, 70-113 (1971) (American
treatment of Latin American countries and use of Organization of American States served as
model for Soviet action with Warsaw Pact in 1968).
135. Id
136. Id In an admission of the precariousness of the position of communist parties in
communist countries, Pravda wrote on July 22, 1968 that
undermining the leading role of the Communist Party inevitably leads to the liquida-
tion of socialist democracy and of the socialist system. Any attempt to question the
leading role of the Communist Party-whatever references to special features of the
situation may be made in order to justify this-inevitably creates a danger to the social-
ist system and threatens the vital common interests of the socialist community.
Reprinted in Soviet News, July 23, 1968, at 41.
137. Id
138. Id
139. See, e.g., People's Daily (Beijing) Mar. 17, 1969:
233
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
sovereignty.
At the moment of invasion, the Soviet government had tried to
strengthen its arguments. Moscow had scrambled to find a "group"
within the Czech Central Committee to ask for Soviet help against
counter-revolution 140 and had appealed to such non-Marxist and non-
legal grounds for action as "Slavic affinity" and the. prior expenditure
of Soviet blood. 141 Unable to find sufficient anti-reformist strength
within the Czech Central Committee, the Soviet government dropped
its original approach and resumed dealings with Dub~ek and his col-
leagues. Discussions in Moscow against the background of the Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia ended in agreement and the repudiation
of reform. 142 Justifying its diplomacy and use of force, the Soviet
Union blurred the distinction between the "law" of peaceful coexis-
tence governing relations between States of differing social systems and
socialist internationalism dictating relations among communist coun-
tries. The Brezhnev Doctrine thus contains elements of a universal the-
ory. Its extension beyond the communist world has already
occurred. 143
Publication of a full exposition of the Soviet view took place five
weeks after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This formulation remains
the basic text for later positions. The author, Sergei Kovalev, repeated
and expanded on the theme "that every Communist Party is responsi-
ble not only to its own people but also to all socialist countries and to
the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this," he added in a
pointed message to the Czechoslovak comrades, "stressing only the in-
dependence of the Communist Parties, takes a one-sided attitude; he
'Limited sovereignty' in essence means that Soviet revisionism can encroach upon the
sovereignty of other countries and interfere in their domestic affairs at will, and even
send its troops into the territory of these countries to suppress the people there, while
the people invaded have no right to resist aggression and safeguard their own sover-
eignty and independence. This is an out-and-out fascist 'theory'.
Reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG. 1ST SESS., CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND
THE BREzHNzv DOCTRINE 48 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE].
140. An anonymous "group of members of the central committee" of the Czech Com-
munist Party allegedly appealed for Soviet assistance. Statement by Tass News Agency,
Aug. 21, 1968, reprinted in Soviet News, Aug. 22, 1968, at 81-82. See also Jones, Autonomy
and Intervention: The CPSU and the Struggle/or the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1968,
19 Oais 591 (1975) (Soviet aim was to prevent autonomy of Czech Party by maintaining
friends of U.S.S.R. in power).
141. The Defence ofSocialsm is Our Supreme Internationalst Duty, supra note 4, at 87.
142. J. VALENTA, supra note 116, at 150-52.




departs from his international duty."' 44 It would be just as absurd for a
party to renounce Marxism-Leninism and remain a communist party
as for communists to ignore the rivalry between Capitalism and
Socialism.
Communist states, Kovalev argued, constitute a "commonwealth"
whose principal member and protector is the Soviet Union. 45 Each
member has a vital interest in the other's affairs. When one of them
threatened to leave the commonwealth, as he claimed the Czech Party
did under the guise of self-determination and reform, then the com-
monwealth had the right, indeed, the duty to react. Implementing their
version of self-determination, the Czechs might allow NATO troops to
approach the borders of the Soviet Union. Such self-determination
could only be a sham and "in fundamental conflict with the right of
these peoples [in the communist countries] to socialist self-determina-
tion."'146 When Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, told the U.N.
General Assembly on October 3 that defending the communist com-
monwealth by invading Czechoslovakia was compatible with peace
and international security, his only justification was the claim that "the
national question has really and truly been solved by socialism." 147 As
restated by Kovalev, bourgeois thinking takes an "abstract" view of
sovereignty that ignores the character of the government. If commu-
nists accepted bourgeois doctrine, they would be unable legally to fight
established governments headed by Franco, Salazar, or the Greek colo-
nels, and support "progressive forces" in places like Vietnam. 48 Under
bourgeois law, this action would constitute interference in the internal
affairs of a sovereign State. Such a result was inconsistent with the
revolution and could not be law. Kovalev ascribed to Lenin the propo-
sition: "[e]ach man must choose between joining our side or the other
side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in
fiasco."149
The Brezhnev Doctrine brings Soviet theory regarding the lawful in-
144. Kovalev, Sovereigny and the Internationalist Duties of Socialist Countries, Pravda,
Sept. 26, 1968, reprinted in Soviet News, Oct. 1, 1968, at 5. (Reprinted elsewhere. The ver-
sion in BREZHNEV DOCTRiNE, supra note 139, at 14, for example, differs in a few instances of
no apparent significance.)
145. Id In 1969, Mikhail Suslov, a Party Secretary and leading ideologist, noted that
"one could no longer speak of 'a leading centre for the communist movement'." C. JACOB-
SEN, SoviET STRATEGY-SovIET FOREIGN POLICY 223 (1972).
146. Kovalev, supra note 144, at 5.
147. 23 U.N. GAOR (1679th plen. mtg.) 7, U.N. Doec. A/PV. 1679 (1968).
148. Kovalev, supra note 144, at 6.
149. Id at 5. Kovalev also wrote that "[tihe sovereignty of each socialist country cannot
be set up in opposition to the interests of 'the socialist world and the interests of the world
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ternational use of force back to the pre-Revolution premise of a di-
vided, antagonistic world where Capitalism and Communism engage
in explosively dangerous rivalry.1 50 Locked in a world view reminis-
cent of Hobbes,151 Soviet officials focus on the "correlation of forces"' 52
in determining the law and its purposes. Soviet analyses demand that a
context different from the rules of the U.N. Charter and universal re-
spect for States define legitimate applications of force. The Soviet view
means that Article 2(4) of the Charter loses its commanding force.'5 3
B. Afghanistan, 1979
Today, Soviet theory expands Kovalev's exposition of the Brezhnev
Doctrine. It applies the justifications for using force in 1956 and 1968
outside the area of relations among communist countries. Afghanistan
provided the setting for this extension of doctrine.
In Soviet eyes, the political and strategic context required action. In
April, 1978, two groups in uneasy alliance had engineered a coup dl/at
revolutionary movement." Id But see G. TUNKIN, supra note 7, at 439-40 (strict respect for
sovereignty in socialist international relations).
Brezhnev denied that Czech sovereignty had been violated by noting that "the socialist
states stand for strict respect of the sovereignty of all countries. We emphatically oppose
interference in the affairs of any states and violations of their sovereignty." Speech to the
Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, in Soviet News, Nov. 19, 1968, at 66.
On the legality of "wars of national liberation," see Tyner, supra note 113 (U.N. Charter
prohibits supporting wars of national liberation).
150. See Binder, supra note 143, quoting an unsigned article in Nopoye Vrem a, Jan. 18,
1980 (the "main point" is "the fundamental differences between the nature and goals of the
foreign policy of socialism and imperialism").
151. See T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (1651).
152. See F. KOHLER, UNDERSTANDING THE RusSIANs 244-45 (1970) (Soviet govern-
ment, more than most western governments, attuned to factors of political, social, economic,
and military power in taking decisions); D. ZAGORIA, THE SINO-SOviET CONFLICT 158, 425
n.22 (1962) (Soviet views on changing balance of force; feasibility of action reflects power);
G. TuNKiN, supra note 7, at 250 ("co-relation" of forces important but powerful states may
not dictate norms of law); Krylov, supra note 7, at 453-54 (power heightens responsibility of
States, and, implicitly, law-making ability).
153. Cf. C. JENKS, A NEw WORLD OF LAw? 294 (1969):
The second principle of world political morality is the immorality of arbitrary force.
The principle finds expression in the provision of the Charter of the United Nations
that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest. The principle is not
based on any idle belief that force settles nothing. Napoleon, who is sometimes quoted
as an authority for this comfortable tenet, espoused it only in St. Helena. Force has
throughout history shaped the future of mankind, for good as well as for ill. It was
force which preserved the future of Greek culture at Marathon. It was by force that the
Roman legions laid the foundations of western civilisation. It was force, not principle,
which drove Hitler to his bunker beneath Berlin. It was force which contained Stalin-
ism. And so throughout the intervening years. Force could have made, but was never
invoked to make, a reality of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Without collec-
tive reliance on force to repel force the United Nations cannot become a reality: this is
indeed the heart of the Charter.
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and presented Moscow with a Marxist government in Kabul. 154 The
allies, Khalq led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and
Parcham with Babrak Karmal as leader, competed for power.- They
fell out over domestic policies and Taraki and Amin excluded Karmal
and his supporters from the government. Amin became Prime Minister
and Taraki President. Karmal went to eastern Europe as Ambassador;
in September he was dismissed.1 55
In foreign affairs, Khalq was openly pro-Soviet; in domestic matters,
the new regime tried to implement reforms. It was inept and encoun-
tered opposition from Islamic fundamentalists that took the form of
armed rebellion. Taraki attempted to overthrow Amin by force.156
The plan failed and Taraki was killed. The Soviet government gave
refuge to Taraki's supporters and brought Karmal to Moscow, while
increasing its military presence in Afghanistan in the guise of helping
to deal with anti-government guerillas. On December 27, 1979, some
5,000 Soviet combat troops entered Afghanistan. Soviet airborne units
overthrew and killed Amin and placed Karmal in power. The Soviets
claimed that they acted in response to pleas for help from Karmal.
Those pleas were broadcast on December 28.157 As evidence that a
government had asked for assistance against rebellion, Karmal's re-
quest was hardly persuasive.
The Soviet government defended its intervention with geopolitical
and socialist-internationalist arguments. Brezhnev combined them in
his speech to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress on February 23, 1981.
"Imperialism launched a real undeclared war against the Afghan
revolution," he said. "This also created a direct threat to the security of
our southern frontier. In the circumstances, we were compelled to
render the military aid asked for by that friendly country." 1518 Three
weeks after Soviet troops intervened in Afghanistan, Moscow claimed
154. See Dupree, Afghanistan under the Khalq, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, July-Aug., 1979,
at 47.
155. Id at 41; 1980 Y.B. INT-'L COMMUNIST AFF. 219, 450 (1980).
156. Khalilzad, Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, Nov.-Dec., 1980,
at 23-24. Unpopular gestures, such as the adoption of a red flag, which signaled Commu-
nism to Islamic fundamentalists, accompanied reforms of land ownership and the status of
the sexes. Violent opposition resulted. See generally Dupree, supra note 154, at 42-46.
157. See id at 24-26; Pravda, Dec. 28, 1979, reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Jan. 23, 1980, at 1, 2. The Soviet Union now has about 85,000 troops in Afghanistan
and, in effect, governs the country. The Soviets did not fear American interference. Just as
in 1956, the United States was too preoccupied to act. On November 4, 19/9, Iran had
seized the American Embassy in Teheran, riveting Washington's attention. Anyway, the
United States had done nothing when its Ambassador to Afghanistan was murdered in Feb-
ruary, 1979.
158. See note 60 supra.
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that the use of force was morally and politically justified by "the inter-
national solidarity of revolutionaries." 159 Assistance might take a mili-
tary form in "justified, extraordinary conditions"1 60 and the Afghan
situation passed the test.161
Soviet jurists claim legal status for the constituent elements of the
Brezhnev Doctrine as applied in Czechosl6vakia and Afghanistan.
Western and Chinese officials and lawyers disagree.1 62 In situations ar-
guably analogous to Soviet behavior in eastern Europe, western com-
mentators denounce American actions as equally illegal.163 Thus
American writers have lumped the 1968 Czech and 1965, Dominican
Republic' 64 crises together as unlawful uses of force, while Tunkin, for
159. Binder, supra note 143.
160. Id See also SOVIET WORLD OUTLOOK, June 15, 1980, at 4, 6 (intervention in Af-
ghanistan legal according to socialist internationalism); New Times No. 17 (Apr., 1980) read
Lenin to say that "the socialist state would if need be help the oppressed classes of other
countries 'using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states'." Id at 4-5.
161. Soviet doctrine thus comes close to asserting a right of preemptive intervention.
Such a claim would not be original. The British, for example (and they were not alone), in
effect claimed a right to prevent a Great Power from establishing itself in the Low Countries
for reasons of national security and geopolitics. American application of the Monroe Doc-
trine reflected similar concerns.
See Brezhnev's remarks on Iran in Pravda,,Jan. 13, 1980, reprinted in SOVIET WORLD
OUTLOOK, Jan. 15, 1980, at 2 (U.S.S.R. would view any interference in Iran as affecting
Soviet security).
162. See generally Krauss, Internal Conflicts and Foreign States: In Search of the State of
Law, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 173 (1979); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT
WORLD 311; 341-42 (1968) (criticism of Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and of
American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965).
For the view of the People's Republic of China, see Letter dated Dec. 31, 1979 from the
Permanent Representative of China addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/13717 (1979).
163. The view of one American professor of international law is characteristic of this
school.
Although, regrettably, lawyers of repute have been found to justify, not in terms of
policy but of international law, unilateral interventions of which they approve politi-
cally, there cannot be any serious doubt that such unilateral military actions designed to
change the political regime of another country-whether they came to power by demo-
cratic means or a coup d'etat-are patently incompatible with the very foundations of
international law, which is built on the legal sovereignty of states and their right to
determine the form of their regime. Neither the assertion of 'socialist solidarity' nor the
Johnson Doctrine which-going far beyond the actual policies of the United States-
would claim a unilateral right to displace any 'Communist' regime, as determined by
the United States-has any place in comtemporary international law.
Friedmann, Intervention and International Law, in INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL
POLrrIcs 40, 47 (L. Jacquet ed. 1971).
164. In 1965 the United States sent troops to the Dominican Republic at what Washing-
ton claimed was the request of the local government to help protect American citizens. In
the course of the crisis, President Johnson argued that the United States could use force to
prevent communist gains in the hemisphere. The facts are in dispute. See T. FRANCK & E.
WEISBAN.D, supra note 134, at 72-78 (suggestion that had American behavior in the Carib-
bean been different Soviet behavior in central Europe would have been different); R. FALK,
supra note 162, at 341-42 (criticism of U.S. and U.S.S.R. for similar behavior).
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example, carefully ignores any similarity between the situations them-
selves or the way the Soviet and American governments respectively
represented them to the world. 165 According to Tunkin, American in-
tervention reflected a policy of acting "from a position of strength." 166
Conclusion
Nowadays, States always say they act within the law. Bethmann
Hollweg, Germany's Chancellor in 1914, was perhaps the last leader of
a belligerent power who admitted that his country had resorted to force
illegally, and he justified German actions by reference to a greater good
that would result.167 Even governments whose representatives belittle
the role and importance of law in international affairs argue that their
forces enter battle on behalf of, and according to law.168 Soviet behav-
ior over Hungary in 1956, and Soviet actions since then, fit this pattern.
Moscow has shown itself to be as concerned as any other capital about
the appearance of international legality. Soviet spokesmen often claim
that Soviet acts must be lawful because communist States may only act
lawfully. 169
The U.N. Charter represents the world consensus about the nature of
world politics and the law governing the international use of force. If it
does nothing else, the Charter reaffirms that the world legal structure is
based on the existence of sovereign States. International lawyers agree
that this fact means that international law concerns itself principally
with inter-State relations and that the State is the traditional and char-
165. See G. TuNIN, supra note 7, at 276 & n.8 and accompanying text.
166. i d at 283. No Soviet author writing in the Soviet Union has criticized Soviet ac-
tions on similar grounds; to do so would itself violate Soviet law. Under Soviet law
[a]gitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet
authority or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or
circulating for the same purpose slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state
and social system, or circulating or preparing or keeping, for the same purpose, litera-
ture of such content, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six
months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years,
or by exile for a term of two to five years.
Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic art. 70, reprinted in H.
BERMAN, SOVIET CRiMiNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 180 (1966). Art. 190(1) makes a crime of
preparing, and distributing, orally or in writing, "of deliberately false fabrications harming
the Soviet state." J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER, & P. MAGGS, THE SoviET LEGAL SYSTEM 97
(1977).
167. See K. JARAUSCH, THE ENGMATC CHANCELLOR 179 (1972); B. TUCHMAN, THE
GUNS OF AUGUST 128 (1962).
168. See, e.g., remarks of Hao Teh-ching (former Ambassador of the People's Republic
of China to Iran) to E. Rostow (June 19, 1978) at 1, 6 (notes by N. Rostow) (copy on fie with
The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
169. See, e.g., note 60 supra.
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acteristic party to disputes at international law.170 Under the Charter,
the Security Council is responsible for maintaining peace. Where
breaches occur that defy pacific settlement, the Council may use force
to "maintain or restore international peace and security." 171 Any Per-
manent Member of the Security Council may, of course, veto action by
that body, as the Soviet Union did in 1956 and 1980 to prevent a U.N.
response to the Hungarian and Afghan crises. 172
Though nominally accepting Charter law, Soviet policy and doc-
trine, as a Chinese Ambassador to the U.N. noted, in fact is incompati-
ble with the rule of Article 2(4). 173 The Soviet position justifies the use
of force to preserve communist gains and add to the territory governed
by communist parties as both legal and progressive. Asymmetrically,
the use of force to protect Capitalism and bourgeois liberties is illegal
as well as oppressive from the Soviet perspective. It may also be
imperialistic.174
Given this situation, appeals to the Security Council to deal with cri-
ses like those involving Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan
will prove as useless in the future as they have in the past. Those States
that prefer to shape their destinies independently of the Soviet Union
must respond on their own; and their response must fit ideas of self-
defense consistent with Article 51.175 The need for self-defense and the
170. See, e.g., note 163 supra; Krylov, supra note 7, at 446; L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (1980); N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J.
SWEENEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 725 (1973); 1.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (3d ed. 1979).
171. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also arts. 41 and 42 (measures, including use of force,
available to Security Council); B. RAMUNDO, supra note 54, at 125-28 (just wars are "non-
predatory" and liberating).
172. See text accompanying note 1.01 supra; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1980, at Al, col.2; id at
A6, col. 5 (text of resolution vetoed).
173. The Chinese have often spoken in this way. See, e.g., Letter dated Dec. 31, 1979
from the Permanent Representative of China addressed to the Secretary-General, supra note
162 (criticism of invasion of Afghanistan); 26 U.N. SCOR (1613th mtg.) 11-13 U.N. Doc. S/
PV.1613 (1971); 26 U.N. SCOR (1615th mtg.) 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1615 (1971) (criticisms
of Soviet view of Bangladesh war of independence).
174. See, eg., Lipson, supra note 51, at 33 (Soviet journal KOMMJNIST edited speech by
Suslov, leading Soviet theoretician, to read "[p]eaceful coexistence means. . . the inadmiss-
ability of the export of counterrevolution" where earliei Pravda version quoted definition as
"the refusal to export revolution and to export counterrevolution.")
175. The position taken by the United States in 1841 in connection with the Caroline
case remains the clearest statement of the law of self-defense.
The President sees with pleasure that your Lordship fully admits those great principles
of public law, applicable to cases of this kind, which this government has expressed; and
that on your part, as on ours, respect for the inviolable character of the territory of
independent states is the most essential foundation of civilization. And while it is ad-
mitted on both sides that there are exceptions to this rule, he is gratified to find that
your Lordship admits that such exceptions must come within the limitations stated and




preservation of the States system implies the existence of a military
threat and nobody has captured the essence of such a threat and the
policy it dictates better than Thucydides: "the strong do what they
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."' 176
But military readiness alone will not deal with the challenge of the
Brezhnev Doctrine. States disputing the Soviet view of the law gov-
erning the international use of force must reply with a coherent legal
position of their own. The alternative consistent with their interests
and values respects the insight of Thucydides and the values embodied
in the Charter.
Because of its international position, the United States must take the
lead in this enterprise. Its role in two world wars brought responsibility
for the world structure established in 1919 and re-established in 1945.
Article 2(4) represented both American national interests and the con-
sensus of the victorious coalition about what international behavior
would be deemed lawful by the community of States. It was based on
the experience of the thirties and forties and the vivid examples of in-
ternational coercion and subversion produced by Hitler, Mussolini, and
the Japanese.
Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow has withdrawn from the con-
sensus. Soviet actions and words interpret Article 2(4) and that inter-
pretation dictates the response needed from the United States. By
proclaiming as scientifically demonstrable truth that western society is
inherently oppressive and imperialistic, the Soviet Union can justify
the international use of force to change political and social conditions
in other countries. And those political and social conditions make the
promise of change appealing, however implemented and of whatever
form, so long as it is described as "progressive." As a result, the United
States needs policies that shore up the stability of the States system and
encourage the economic development of States within that system. The
necessary goal is the stimulation of development and social justice
tentiary here. Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions growing
out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to
cases in which the 'necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.'
J. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). See generally Brownlie, The
Use of Force in Sef-Defence, 1961 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 182.
It may be thought that Soviet contravention of the Charter or Soviet vetoes of U.N. action
to enforce the Charter merit expulsion from the United Nations under Article 6. Apart from
the practical difficulty of mustering the votes in the Security Council and General Assembly
necessary to expel one of the Permanent Members of the organization, expulsion would not
remove the challenge to the Charter order posed by a Great Power advocating a premise for
the use of force different from that articulated in Articles 2(4) and 51.
176. THUJCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 402 (R. Warner trans., rev. ed. 1972).
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while perserving the integrity of the international legal system codified
in the Charter. 177
The United States may cooperate with other governments to promote
development without necessarily dictating the form or composition of a
government, its policies, or social structure. It has done so in the past,
most notably with the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction after
the war and with its relationship with the countries of ASEAN, South
Korea, and Taiwan. Such policies strengthen the States system by
strengthening the States themselves. They aim, not to impose hegem-
ony, but to encourage pluralism. One may expect skeptics to criticize
such policies as devoted to a status quo that ignores the value of self-
determination, which the Charter recognized, 178 and merely protects
American economic and political interests. For people of this school,
Soviet and American policies and doctrines resemble each other. 179
This criticism reflects a yearning for a better world, but does not pro-
vide a new premise, legal or other, for a coherent foreign policy.
Favoring self-determination, for example, hardly applies outside colo-
nial areas of which few now exist. To espouse self-determination for
eastern Europe is sound law but raises the kind of political questions
and anxieties that prompted Helmut Sonnenfeldt, when Counselor to
the State Department in 1976, to recommend that the United States
favor an "organic" relationship between the Soviet Union and the rest
of the Warsaw Pact in the interests of stability. 80 The United States
can avoid the retreat from law Sonnenfeldt suggested by pursuing poli-
cies designed to secure States against attack. Such policies would pos-
sess firm legal foundation; they would encourage conditions of
177. Such is the goal of efforts to resolve the Namibia affair consistently with the Advi-
sory Opinion of the International CoUrt of Justice. Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Se-
curity Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16. See the discussion in E. Rostow,
"Palestinian Self-Determination'" Possible Futures/or the Unallocated Territories of the Pal-
estine Mandate, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD Pun. ORD. 147, 156-58 (1979).
178. See U. N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (the Purposes of the United Nations are: 'To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples.")
179. See generally T. FRANCK & G. WEISBAND, supra note 134.
180. D. MOYNIHAN & S. WEAVER, A DANGEROUS PLACE 269-70 (1978).
Western policies based on Article 2(4) may produce responses to events such as the inva-
sion of Afghanistan or the recent political changes in Poland other than military action or
economic sanctions. The extent of Polish indebtedness to the West, for example, creates
opportunities for pressure on the new government in Warsaw. One can imagine western
institutions, or multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, using the
leverage of Polish indebtedness to require changes in economic policy in the interests of
restoring Polish economic health. In Poland, such policies would involve restoring the posi-
tion of the unions if only to encourage Poles to work productively. Passive acceptance of, or




independence and security in which human rights of political freedom
and economic development can survive and grow.
The States system characterizes the world as it is and shapes the law
of the U.N. Charter. Soviet participation in the U.N. and relations
with States outside the reach of the Red Army amounts to acceptance
of that system. While seeking to benefit from the world order of the
Charter, Moscow has inconsistently obeyed its commands and
respected the premises on which the Charter rests. Justifications for
Soviet behavior couched in Marxist-Leninist theory, however valid
some people may believe the theory to be, do not change the fact that
Soviet actions violate the code of the system. Unless the West, and
particularly the United States, maintains foreign and defense policies
designed to preserve and strengthen the States system-policies rooted
in the Charter and especially Article 2(4)-the Soviet view of the law
governing the use of force shall prevail. In such an event, the structure
of world public order will reflect Soviet preferences.181
181. It may be that the western view will triumph because it reflects the nature of things:
a States system exists; it is global; whenever threats to an uncontroversial state arise (not
Israel, not South Africa), the rest of the world has at least verbalized its insistence on the rule
of the Charter. The crises over Biafra, Bangladesh, Uganda, and Afghanistan, for example,
reflexively generated anxiety or even a disparate coalition in defense of Article 2(4). The
world system responded, perhaps ineffectively, but following the pattern of the eighteenth
century "classical" European balance of power.
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